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EU Trade and Climate Policy Linkages 
Potentials in Times of Repositioning 
Susanne Dröge and Felix Schenuit 
The European Union (EU) was instrumental in successfully negotiating the Paris 
Agreement in 2015 and is now seeking a rapid international implementation. To 
this end, climate policy should be brought into line with as many foreign policies 
as possible, including trade policy. Free trade in environmental goods or the 
application of national emission standards to traded goods can accelerate climate 
protection globally. The legal support for this agenda through the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and its dispute settlement bodies will merely be a longer-term 
option. Therefore, the EU and its member states should engage on two fronts in 
particular. Firstly, the fora of the United Nations (UN) and the WTO should make 
the links between the two policy areas even more transparent. Secondly, the EU 
can operationalise its regional free trade agreements as a lever to push for the 
implementation of climate policies in its partner countries. In particular, the EU 
should review existing trade agreements for their “climate friendliness”. If the 
EU succeeds in redesigning its external relations at this interface, it can both en-
hance its climate policy performance and become more proactive in trade policy. 
 
In the course of the last 10 years, it has 
become clear that more policy areas have 
to be part of the overall effort to achieve 
the global greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
targets. An ambitious climate and energy 
policy alone is not enough to deliver on the 
global temperature limits agreed under the 
Paris Agreement and to deal with inevitable 
climate change impacts. Therefore, trade 
policy also has to be put to the test when it 
comes to specifying the nationally deter-
mined contributions (NDCs) announced by 
the parties to the Paris Agreement. Foreign 
trade can both support and undermine 
climate protection. For example, trade in 
climate-friendly technologies and products 
can ensure their rapid deployment and 
more innovation. Exemptions from trade 
barriers therefore increase the speed of – 
and opportunities for – implementation of 
the NDCs worldwide. On the other hand, 
differences between national climate policy 
measures and related costs can contribute 
to outsourcing when companies change 
their supply chains or production sites in 
response to such measures (carbon leakage).  
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The EU Facing 
Particular Challenges 
The European Union and its member states 
are currently facing particular challenges, 
both in international climate policy and 
in trade policy. Negotiating the Paris Agree-
ment was a diplomatic landmark. As a 
consequence, the EU needs to get ready for 
a step change and must breathe life into 
the agreement by increasing efforts in the 
member states, at the EU level, and in its 
external relations. This has become im-
mensely difficult both internally – because 
of reluctant EU member states – and 
externally. If the United States (US) follows 
up on its 2017 announcement and with-
draws from the agreement in 2020, there is 
reason to expect that international efforts 
to protect the climate will slow down. The 
EU cannot fill this gap on its own (SWP 
Comment 1/2018) and needs more capacity 
to mobilise its partners and intensify exist-
ing cooperation. 
A renaissance of protectionism has 
gained speed in international trade rela-
tions. It is further aggravated by the US 
government’s aggressive stance towards 
its trading partners, most recently through 
tariffs announced for steel and alumin-
ium products, based on national security 
grounds. These tariffs, if applied, are 
capable of weakening the multilateral 
trading system considerably, because they 
are not covered by WTO rules on 
exemptions from free trade. 
Moreover, the functioning of the WTO 
dispute settlement bodies is threatened, 
too. A blockade of the US administration 
in the appointments of new judges to the 
WTO Appellate Body calls into question 
future arbitration rulings. If Washington 
continues to deny their approval, the panel 
of seven judges would shrink from the cur-
rent four to two in the course of 2018, and 
would thus also formally no longer be able 
to work from 2019 onwards.  
For the interface of trade and climate 
policy, a weaker WTO is particularly prob-
lematic because, in recent years, an increas-
ing awareness of the synergies has devel-
oped between the multilateral institutions 
of both the trade and climate regimes (SWP 
Research Paper 1/2018). 
In international climate policy, the 
Chinese government wants to close the 
leadership gap left by the US, and it would 
also be open to doing so together with the 
EU. For this, however, Beijing lacks the 
experience as well as foreign policy capac-
ities. Moreover, China is driving forward 
the major geo-economic project “Belt and 
Road Initiative” in its western neighbour-
hood, in which European interests play 
a subordinate role, if any at all (SWP 
Research Paper 2/2016). As China has been 
repeatedly compensating for a decline in its 
business cycle by exporting overcapacities 
at dumping prices, there are long-standing 
disputes over anti-dumping measures by 
the EU for Chinese steel imports. The con-
flict has not yet been solved, and there is 
also a dispute pending over Chinese solar-
module exports to the EU. 
Finally, in the course of Brexit, the EU’s 
trade and climate policy cooperation with 
the United Kingdom (UK) will have to be 
redesigned. With the UK, both a climate-
policy progressive member state and a 
strong advocate of free trade will leave 
the Union. It is still unclear how the nego-
tiators from Brussels and London will regu-
late British access to the internal market 
and climate policy cooperation for the post-
transition period.  
Far Reaching Competences – 
the EU Mandates 
The EU has many responsibilities and a 
strong mandate in trade and climate policy. 
Trade policy falls within the group of 
“exclusive competences” of the EU (Art. 3 
TFEU). It is therefore up to the European 
Commission to negotiate agreements with 
third countries. Although the EU’s trade 
policy approach is guided by multilateral-
ism and the leading role of the WTO, the 
EU also began negotiating bilateral agree-
ments in the 1990s, for example with 
emerging economies and countries of the 
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). A Partnership 
Agreement has been in place with the Afri-
can, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 
since 2008 (SWP Research Paper 6/2015). 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) agreement with the US 
has been on hold since Donald Trump was 
elected president, and negotiations are not 
expected to continue any time soon. By 
contrast, the European-Canadian free trade 
agreement CETA (Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement) was adopted in 
autumn 2017, despite difficult coordination 
processes within the EU. 
Climate policy falls under the “shared 
competences” of the EU (Art. 4 TFEU), that 
is, it is not the sole responsibility of the 
Commission to conduct policies and meas-
ures. Nevertheless, the EU is one of the 
most important actors in international 
climate policy. Its strong position is based 
on its status as a party to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the other climate 
agreements. The EU negotiating team at 
the Conferences of the Parties consists of 
members of the European Commission, 
representatives of the respective EU presi-
dencies and the European External Action 
Service, and negotiators from the EU mem-
ber states (SWP Comment 1/2018). 
The European Commission, together 
with the member states, can use the com-
petences in both policy areas as well as 
their interdependence to raise the profile of 
the EU’s external relations. To achieve this, 
the EU member states will have to reacti-
vate their support for trade and climate 
policy projects alike. The integration of cli-
mate policy objectives into new trade and 
investment agreements has the potential 
to increase public support for trade agree-
ments, which has dropped sharply during 
the last few years. Also, the EU producers 
of climate-friendly technologies depend on 
trade policies that are supportive of climate 
policy measures in their home markets, as 
the global market for environmental goods 
and climate-protection technologies is 
growing. 
Environment and Climate in the 
International Trade Regime 
Since the 1990s, environmental policy 
objectives have been taken into account in 
trade agreements. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) set new stand-
ards in 1993, as, for the first time ever, 
environmental concerns were part of the 
negotiations on investment and free trade. 
The NAFTA preamble includes the principle 
of sustainable development. Among other 
things, the agreement stipulates that com-
petitive advantages must not be created by 
lowering legal environmental standards. 
Also, environmental aspects have to be 
taken into account in dispute settlements, 
and environmental impacts of trade 
liberalisation have to be monitored. NAFTA 
allows that if certain conditions apply, 
national environmental standards may be 
higher than those of trading partners, even 
if this could disadvantage imports. NAFTA 
also has had an impact on the work under-
taken by international organisations. The 
OECD, the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), and UN organisations 
started to pay attention to the links be-
tween environment and trade. As a con-
sequence, the preamble to the 1995 WTO 
agreement explicitly refers to the objective 
of sustainable development. The WTO has 
also established the Committee on Trade 
and Environment as a permanent point 
of contact for WTO members on environ-
mental and trade issues. 
The Paris Agreement contains no cross-
references to trade rules. However, the 1992 
UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol both 
specify that climate policy must not conflict 
with free trade rules. The UNFCCC’s text 
passages on this point are, in part, citations 
of the relevant GATT wordings. After 2020, 
the Paris Agreement will leave it at the dis-
cretion of the parties whether they want 
to include their trade policy agendas in the 
design of their NDCs – which China and 
India are already practicing in their energy 
policies. Initial inventories show that many 
NDCs have trade-relevant aspects, be it due 
to emissions trading in the countries con-
SWP Comment 16 
April 2018 
4 
cerned, the explicit demand for inter-
national technology transfer, or the am-
bitious plans for increasing renewable 
energies. 
WTO: Free Trade for 
Environmental Goods 
In July 2014, 16 WTO member states and 
the EU launched an initiative to negotiate a 
new plurilateral agreement under the WTO 
to liberalise trade in environmental goods 
(Environmental Goods Agreement, EGA). 
Plurilateral agreements can subsequently 
be recognised by all WTO countries, in-
cluding those that were not involved in the 
negotiations. The EGA is a follow-up to a 
decision of the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation) states on the reduction of 
customs duties for certain environmental 
goods, for example air-pollution-control 
technology, waste disposal and recycling, 
water treatment, or renewable-energy tech-
nologies. In the course of the EGA nego-
tiations, APEC’s list of environmental goods 
was extended. However, negotiations were 
suspended at the end of 2016, partly be-
cause the EU and China were unable to 
agree on the inclusion of certain products 
on this list. A revival of the talks and a suc-
cessful conclusion would help to increase 
awareness of the synergies between climate 
and trade goals and to accelerate the inter-
national deployment of resource-efficient 
technologies. 
WTO Disputes on 
Renewable-energy Policies 
The GATT case law and, subsequently, 
the dispute settlement bodies of the WTO 
specify how environmental- and climate-
protection provisions must be taken into 
account in international trade law and 
where they violate it. In the 1990s, particu-
lar cases rose to attention because the WTO 
panels declared that trade measures to pro-
tect the environment were legitimate if 
certain conditions were met, among others 
that the protected object can be defined as 
a global resource. Disputes over national 
energy-policy measures have been increas-
ing since 2010. For example, Japan and the 
EU took action against Ontario’s renewable-
energy feed-in tariff because they believed 
it discriminated against foreign technology 
products. After an in-depth investigation, 
the WTO panel ruled in favour of the plain-
tiffs, and the Province of Ontario had to 
amend its programme in 2014. 
The EU is also being accused. China has 
called for WTO consultations on various 
feed-in laws, which contain local content 
clauses, thereby favouring national solar-
energy products and discriminating against 
Chinese suppliers. Four lawsuits have been 
filed against the alleged preference for bio-
diesel produced in EU member states. The 
US, on the other hand, complained that 
China and India were creating advantages 
for their national producers and invest-
ments over foreign competitors by applying 
local content clauses for components of 
renewable-energy plants. This, according to 
the complaint, led to the dumping of solar 
modules and components for wind turbines 
in the US market, which is why the US re-
acted with import duties. Not all cases have 
been closed. China and India reacted by 
filing new cases at the WTO complaining 
against the countervailing measures of 
the US. 
It is very likely that the number of con-
flicts and the level of involvement of WTO 
dispute settlement bodies will increase as 
more and more countries implement their 
climate policies in accordance with the Paris 
Agreement. This is also because govern-
ments are not willing to jeopardise their in-
dustrial policy objectives. In order to reduce 
GHGs, states are resorting to subsidies for 
domestic companies, taxes, and levies as 
well as to stricter regulations and standards. 
Due to the deep integration of the global 
economy, such measures are also having an 
impact on traded goods and foreign invest-
ments, making disputes more likely. 
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Options for Reforming Trade 
Agreement Rules 
The WTO rules and regional trade agree-
ments are the legal backbone when it 
comes to taking trade rules into account 
in designing national and international 
climate policy. The search for a reconcilia-
tion of climate and trade policy objectives 
should first and foremost focus on syn-
ergies, that is, how trade agreements and 
WTO law can be interpreted and expanded 
in order to advance climate policy objec-
tives. Climate policy can be supported with 
trade policy instruments such as customs 
duties or sanctions. For example, climate 
policy cooperation can be made more bind-
ing if partner countries include in their 
trade rules some form of sanctioning in 
cases where a party deviates from the com-
monly defined objectives. 
However, trade sanctions in particular 
are a politically sensitive instrument. If 
used for environmental and climate policy 
reasons, there is often the allegation of 
green protectionism. Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement mentions climate policy coali-
tions as a way forward for cooperation, 
for example for countries with emissions 
trading schemes. In general, however, the 
idea of sanctioning, that is, excluding a 
party from such a club, should be handled 
with care. When implementing national 
climate policy measures, inclusive regional 
or bilateral cooperation is of high political 
importance. If frontrunners, to whom the 
historical polluter countries belong (e.g. the 
US, the EU, or other OECD countries), create 
climate clubs with trade barriers as part of 
their climate agenda, developing countries 
could be disadvantaged in their trade rela-
tions. This makes climate clubs with trade 
sanctions highly problematic. Instead, in-
clusiveness could create confidence among 
developing countries and contribute to 
securing the global consensus reached in 
the Paris Agreement. 
The legal situation also yields some 
issues. WTO law provides for exemptions 
to the principles of free trade in order to 
protect global resources. These special rules 
have been applied in the aforementioned 
disputes. However, should this system 
be confronted with more lawsuits in the 
future due to the large number of con-
ceivable climate policy measures, this could 
lead to an overload. It is therefore impor-
tant to specify WTO rules to clarify how 
climate policy and trade measures can be 
reconciled. Among other things, an authori-
tative interpretation of Article XX GATT 
could be introduced. Such an interpretation 
regulates exceptions to the basic principles 
of free trade. It could be determined that 
the protection of the global atmosphere 
constitutes a reason for limiting free trade. 
Still, such an exemption would need to be 
linked to the strict conditions in place to 
prevent its protectionistic use. 
A one-year waiver or a peace clause 
could also be considered to support the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. 
They would have to be renewed on a regu-
lar basis. Both would allow free trade re-
strictions for a limited period. During this 
period, no country would be allowed to 
bring up a WTO case against the related 
trade measures. 
Reforms, which require the agreement 
of all WTO member states, are currently un-
likely from a political point of view. How-
ever, the discussion on the trade policy im-
plications of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and on the implementation of 
Agenda 2030 also shows that the WTO 
trade rules need to be more specific in order 
to exploit synergies and avoid conflicts in 
the longer term (SWP Comment 39/2017). 
Regional Trade Agreements 
Give Directions 
The international trade regime has become 
increasingly fragmented over the last two 
decades. By February 2018, the WTO had 
been notified of a total of 669 regional free 
trade agreements, of which 455 were in 
force. In the 47 years leading up to the crea-
tion of the WTO in 1995, however, it had 
only been notified of 124. 
The trend towards so-called mega-regional 
agreements has contributed to this. This cat-
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egory includes CETA, the currently frozen 
TTIP, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
free trade agreement negotiated between 
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Ma-
laysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singa-
pore, the US, and Vietnam. Talks are also 
underway on a comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement between the ASEAN 
member states and Australia, China, India, 
Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. 
Environmental Clauses in 
Regional Agreements 
Since NAFTA and its supplemental agree-
ment on environmental standards, environ-
mental provisions have been incorporated 
into many regional free trade agreements. 
These provisions can be general environ-
mental-protection clauses, such as the goal 
of sustainable development, or they can 
safeguard national environmental stand-
ards. Tariff reductions for environmental 
goods and services or intentions to intensify 
cooperation on climate protection are also 
included. The EU has played its part in this 
development. A current example is the EU-
Canadian CETA: Chapter 24 of the treaty 
text deals with environmental issues. The 
negotiations on TTIP also included a chap-
ter on sustainable development. Moreover, 
the TPP agreement, to which the EU is not 
a party, also defines the interface between 
trade policy and environmental legislation 
in Chapter 20. Last but not least, the agree-
ment between the EU and the Caribbean 
states contains agreements on poverty 
reduction and environmental protection 
that support sustainable development, and 
thus goes beyond pure trade liberalisation 
(SWP Research Paper 6/2015). 
The Way Forward for 
EU Policy Action 
Both WTO reforms and negotiations on 
regional free trade agreements are time-
consuming. Therefore, the existing trade 
and climate forums and processes will have 
to be connected in a better way. The Euro-
pean Commission can modify existing trade 
agreements and integrate climate targets 
into ongoing discussions with partner coun-
tries. For example, ACP countries need 
support, as spelt out in their NDCs, in par-
ticular for low-carbon energy supply or 
adaptation to climate change. Accordingly, 
the European Commission should examine 
whether the EU’s trade agreements support 
these objectives and whether improvements 
can be made. Regarding emerging econo-
mies and OECD countries, the EU can set up 
climate action as an additional item in new 
or ongoing negotiations, as announced by 
Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström in 
February 2018. This is already being prac-
tised in the negotiations on the Japan-EU 
Free Trade Agreement. The European Par-
liament also recently called in a joint report 
by the Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs for closer integra-
tion of European climate diplomacy objec-
tives with trade policy. 
Transparency within and between 
the UNFCCC and WTO fora can also be im-
proved. The Forum on the Impact of the 
Implementation of Response Measures, 
which deals with the economic conse-
quences of climate policy, is part of the 
UNFCCC. Trade policy aspects of climate 
policy can also be raised there. The WTO 
has a comprehensive notification register 
for national standards and other measures 
relevant to trade policy. The Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism is an important source 
of information for member states and can 
increase transparency. Another option is 
to extend the WTO Committee on Trade 
and Environment to a Committee on Trade, 
Environment and Climate. Such a move, 
however, would need the support of WTO 
members. 
The French government urged that the 
EU’s trade policy should make US support 
for the Paris Agreement a prerequisite for 
new trade negotiations with Washington. 
However, the impact of such a measure 
would be limited. The implementation of 
the Paris Agreement depends not only 
on its ratification, but mainly on concrete 
 SWP Comment 16 
 April 2018 
 7 
national policies. Therefore, this condi-
tionality would need concrete ideas on how 
trade rules should be linked to compliance 
with climate commitments. In this context, 
the European Commission has recently 
ruled out sanctions, indirectly rejecting 
the French government’s claims. 
As trade disputes between the US and the 
EU are becoming more acute, a trade agree-
ment at this time is very unlikely anyway. 
Rather, another proposal by the French gov-
ernment could attract new attention: Presi-
dent Emmanuel Macron used a climate 
policy summit in Paris in December 2017 to 
once again promote so-called border carbon 
adjustments. Accordingly, imported prod-
ucts would be subject to an emissions 
charge if they belonged to sectors that fall 
under the European emissions trading 
system or are subject to a CO2 tax in EU 
countries. 
The European Commission could also 
focus more on other trading partners and 
consider where interests are converging in 
light of US policies. Such talks could be ini-
tiated with China, following up on Presi-
dent Xi Jinping’s climate policy leadership 
claims he has raised several times. The 
starting points would be the trade disputes 
over steel trade, which basically is an issue 
of global overcapacity in the sector. Also, 
the introduction of an emissions trading 
scheme in China, which will cover the 
country’s steel producers, would be suited 
for deeper cooperation. A revival of mutual 
reflections on tariff reductions for climate-
friendly products could also help to re-
launch discussions on the EGA under the 
WTO. With a revitalised EGA initiative, 
the European Commission, Germany, and 
France could not only follow up with con-
crete measures to achieve their climate 
targets. At the same time, the agreement 
would also offer the opportunity to 
strengthen the WTO as an international 
organisation, and thus the multilateral 
orientation of European trade policy. Espe-
cially in times of increasing protectionism 
and the threat of a “trade war” between 
the US and the EU, a return to multilateral 
formats can form an antipole to President 
Trump’s ever-sharper rhetoric. 
In the medium term, Brexit offers the 
opportunity to conclude a trade agreement 
with the UK that is more comprehensive 
than previous regional agreements and 
fully integrates trade- and investment-
related climate targets. Although such an 
agreement, often referred to as “CETA +”, 
could not reflect the full climate policy 
agenda built by the EU and the UK, Brussels 
and London could set new standards for 
linking trade and climate policy. 
In view of the public rejection of TTIP 
and CETA, the European Commission has 
already made efforts to increase public 
participation in the development of such 
agreements (“Trade for All” strategy). If 
these efforts included the protection of 
global public goods, comprising not only 
the climate but also oceans and forests, and 
thus were to become more visible in the 
EU’s external economic relations, this could 
have a positive impact on the public’s 
acceptance of free trade agreements. 
As possible synergy effects are already 
being discussed at the European level, 
member states should also take greater 
account and exploit them. If the EU posi-
tions itself as an advocate for merging trade 
and climate policy interests, it not only has 
the opportunity to fulfil its role as the cli-
mate policy frontrunner. It can also pro-
actively shape its trade policy, and therefore 
pursue its political, economic, and geo-
strategic interests. 
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